Название: Military government under General Winfield Scott
Серия: Training Packet no. 58
Издательство: Camp Gordon, GA : Provost Marshal General's School
Страниц: 87
Формат: PDF
Размер: 25 Мб
Качество: Хорошее
Год: 1951
Язык: английский
General Winfield Scott, although others had preceded him as United States Military Governors of conquered territory, was the first to leave a completely documented record of a comprehensive military and military government operation. He combined mastery of warfare with an equal mastery of civil administrative skill. The reader may wonder why he should be required to study an operation over one hundred (100) years old. The United States occupation of Germany after World War II is so extensive and so complex that no one understands it readily. Scott's occupation of Mexico was a limited operation; a reader can readily see the principle or policy involved in each act. When a student desires to refresh himself concerning a principle he studies a simple, easily understandable application of it; Scott's military government of Mexico is the classic easily understandable instance of United States military government. Contrary to World War I and II operations in which the whole countryside in the combat area was swept clean by a broad front, General Scott maintained his small force inland at the end of a long thin line of communication to the sea. His force was at all times open to being encircled and cut off from either flank. Maintaining that slender line of communication required unusual skill in the administration of the civilian population in order to gain their support rather than to turn them into enemies. This situation faces any army of small size in a vast country where it can control only a limited number of population centers and the roads and railroads which connect them. General Scott secured the support of the Mexican population against a non-democratic government. He disciplined his own troops so strictly that the Mexican people respected them. His actions were sometimes harsher than modern practice permits. He subsisted his troops off the land to a degree which the United States Army no longer practices. The reader is cautioned to keep these facts in mind. With these reservations the reader can instruct himself by the study of this historically famous instance of successful administration of occupied people by a United States commander. From it he can learn the principles we apply today.
